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In the recent era, and thanks to technologic advancements, some new constructions or phenomena have appeared that may revolutionize human life dramatically, whether cheerfully or imperatively, mentally or materially, subliminally or substantively. For example, artificial intelligence (AI) in the sphere of arts, robots with reference to human services, or virtual reality in games or motion pictures may have transfigured the earlier concepts regarding typical boundaries, capabilities, or aspirations of human beings. Even some persons may suppose that, for instance, in the future, AI may replace fine art or graphic arts and artists, silicon dolls may replace spouses, children, and pets, and machines may replace persons. On the other hand, the movie industry, novels, and media, too, may reinforce the said expectations, whether unswervingly or meanderingly, by their enigmatic constructions or trailers, especially when their fabricators contemplate in the same way. Incidentally, younger populaces, in consort with their broader life expectancy, desires, or drives, although with lesser experience or practical insight, may validate such prospects more profoundly or frantically. Likewise, when anticipations are contrasting with abilities and competencies are challenging with veracities, then unconscious rationalization may operate as an adjunctive catalyst for detection of likelihoods in the midst of no-noes. But, like any fresh medication, which usually has a combination of ingenious worth and novel side effects, neither of the above evolutions could be assumed, as well, without some possible domino effects, like unkind misuse, deception, or fraudulence, which is not the topic of the present paper. Anyway, is it truly possible to replace genuine characters with fictitious ones? To be precise, is it possible, sooner or later, to replace a factual partner with a verbal puppet or substitute an actual artist with a made-up actor, singer, or something else? In the field of sexual roles, even people with paraphilia (state) may admire such contrived inventions only till the unavailability of true-life sex objects (as supplementary objects), though persons with the ingrained trait of paraphilia may not dismiss them easily, even after the removal of willing or unwilling bans or deficiencies. But, paraphilia is categorized as a kind of sexual dysfunction among a minority of individuals, and it is not a standard behavior, though it may make available enough customers for the survival of such businesses or merchandise. On the other hand, among conventional folks, though joyful sighting may be accounted as an important initial step for unification of rapport between self and other, it may not be completed without additional verbal and nonverbal communications if a substantial bonding is necessary for further interactions, a phenomenon that is, at least presently, implausible, for example, with respect to humanoid dolls or robots. 

Figuratively, inner sense or instinctual inference of ‘self’ (in the frame of the self-psychology school of psychoanalysis) has an important role regarding acceptance of ‘other.’ So, while, for example, a flamboyant artist or singer who has been created by artificial intelligence can be beloved and followed by many aficionados, the situation may differ meaningfully when the said followers realize that they are admiring merely a sequence of serial images, not a series of communal events. Covert A sense of identification and likeness with overt, but real, objects may guarantee an increasing sentiment or empathy by onlookers, which may not be formed, or may evaporate rapidly, if they discover the illusoriness of the aforementioned performers. By the same token, though the sequence of events and interactions in a made-up motion picture may be identical with the scenes of a real movie, the realness of the performers or surroundings may generate a more enriched inner sense of sympathy in a spectator, who prefers to see his own wishes, concerns, or pains in an object with the same aspirations, capabilities, or limitations, comparable to an adolescent, who does not enjoy fairy tales anymore, which, perhaps, were previously her favorite subjects. Similar to a swindler, who may not excite public sympathy any more after the revealing of his tricks, an artificial actor or movie, too, may not be, finally, anything more than a semi-real player in a PlayStation game or a well-refurbished cartoon, correspondingly. While reality-testing, as the major cognitive tool for differentiation between dreams, fantasies, and actualities, seems to discern automatically, labeling by that as non-real, too, may degrade, reflexively, manufactured occurrences in comparison with natural sensations. On the other hand, every artist has a number of identifications, including historical and socio-cultural physiognomies, which are, while identifiable by observers, typically absent with respect to made-up creatures. 

Therefore, genuine characters may never be substituted by weird charismas due to a lack of the said backgrounds, characteristic dimensions, or distinctive communications or interactions. On the other hand, disregarding the aforementioned paraphilia, it is not deniable that, for example, magical thinking in obsessive people, interactional aberrancy in schizoid persons, perceptual or cognitive idiosyncrasies in schizotypal individuals, or tricky attachment in persons with intellectual discrepancies may act as predisposing or precipitating factors with respect to the establishment of energetic rapport with such simulated beings. Also, while imaginations, illusions, and pseudo-hallucinations may have some similarities with organized hallucinations, an intact reality-testing and unaffected ego-boundary are, eventually, expected to differentiate between fantasy and reality and to distinguish between earlier happenings, which are likely incidences, and the later manifestations, which are among the specific psychotic symptoms of insanities. Such a logical process helps to avoid insecure circumstances and keep the necessary balance between internal egoistic drives and external ego-dystonic truths. So, the said mechanism, once again, may cut down, insentiently, the significance of made-up thespian, portrait, or related excitement. 

Possibly, due to said explanations, ingenious maneuvers, like cross-dressing by transgender individuals or persons with transvestic fetishism, usage of silicon masks or babies by pretenders or charlatans, verbosities by play-actors, affectionate demos by fibbers, fabricated profiles by serial dating sites, etc., may not impact their targets effectually or expectedly after disclosing of their concealed identities, drives, or seditions. Then again, though commercial propaganda or interests may reinforce such types of simulated affections between real persons and dreamlike identities by means of the creation of hyper-realistic configurations, images, or related commodities, the induction of such a type of imaginary sentimental attachment may not be sufficiently inclusive, maintainable, or considerable. Alternatively, any merchandise that is going to gratify, completely, the aforesaid standards, may not be anything less than a tangible living being, accompanied by its genuine sensitive, fleshy, or interactive features. Equally, although an artificially engendered sound or appearance may manipulate unacquainted fools or keep amused some deprived individuals, they may not, finally, substitute their factual equivalents after disclosure of mendacities by victims or attainment of wants by losers. Like substance-induced synesthesia or psychoses, which are usually momentary, such types of provoked excitations are provisional as well, because the genesis of comradeship is not independent of mentality as an essential ground, knowledge as a supplemental part, insight as an assessing implement, and desire as an initiative factor—components that are not toning effortlessly with dreamlike makings. Like the excitation of a game, which is not usually beyond the game, or its effect, which is not usually more than a few days, or till the next game, the excitation of fabricated phenomena, too, seems unlikely to be endless or more than, let's say a temporary sedative for a chronic migraine [1-13].